

CLAUDIA NERI

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RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS

Research: Experimental Economics, Game Theory, Applied Econometrics, Market Microstructure
Teaching: Microeconomics, Econometrics, Finance

DOCTORAL STUDIES

Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois
Dissertation: Essays on Strategic Thinking and Subjective Expectations
Committee Chairperson: Professor Charles Manski
Date of Completion: July 2010 (expected)

PREDOCTORAL STUDIES

M.A.: Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 2005.
M.A.: Economics, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain, 2004.
Diploma: Economics, Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy, 2003.
B.A.: Economics, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy, 2002 (*summa cum laude*).

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Northwestern University Fellowship, 2006-2009
Giovanna Crivelli Fellowship, Unicredit Group, Milan, Italy, 2003-2006
Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies Fellowship, Pisa, Italy, 1998-2002

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2009
International Business Strategy in Non-Market Environments (MBA)
Teaching Assistant, Northwestern University, 2007-2009
Economics of the Family (Undergraduate)

JOB MARKET PAPER

“Strategic Thinking and Subjective Expectations in a Double Auction Experiment”

Abstract: This paper investigates the role of subjective beliefs in strategic decision-making within a double auction experiment. The experiment elicits agents' beliefs about the bidding decisions of other market participants using a quadratic scoring rule. I show that subjective beliefs cannot be modeled by equilibrium beliefs or by empirical/historical beliefs, and that elicited subjective beliefs help explain observed choices. Observed choices often deviate from the predictions of the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) model. Evidence suggests that the failure of the game to converge to equilibrium is due to subjective beliefs not converging to equilibrium beliefs. The results caution against the assumption that subjective beliefs coincide with equilibrium beliefs, especially when the goal is to explain why observed choices do not coincide with equilibrium predictions.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Measuring Second-Order Subjective Expectations” with Charles Manski, in progress.

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Age: 30, Marital status: Single, Citizenship: Italian

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LANGUAGE SKILLS

Fluent in English, Spanish and Italian.

REFERENCES

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