

## RENATO GOMES

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### RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS

Research: Applied Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Industrial Organization  
Teaching: Game Theory, Industrial Organization

### DOCTORAL STUDIES

Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois  
Dissertation: Mechanism Design in Two-Sided Markets  
Committee Chairpersons: Professors Alessandro Pavan and Marco Ottaviani  
Date of Completion: July 2010 (expected)

### PREDOCTORAL STUDIES

M.A., Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 2007  
M.S. *summa cum lauda*, Economics, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2005  
B.S., Economics, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2002

### FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Conference Travel Grant, Northwestern University, 2009  
Dissertation Year Fellowship, Northwestern University, 2008-09  
Yahoo! Key Technical Challenges (KTC) Grant, 2008  
Center for the Study of Industrial Organization Fellowship, Northwestern University, Fall 2008  
Graduate Fellowship, Northwestern University, 2005-2007  
"First Student" Fellowship, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, 2004  
Brazilian Government (CAPES) Fellowship for M.S. studies, 2003

### TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant, Northwestern University, 2006-2008  
Undergraduate: Intro to Micro, Intro to Macro, Economic History, Formal Models in Political Science, Behavioral Economics, Pricing (for Kellogg Business program).  
Teaching Assistant, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, 2002-2005  
Graduate: Econometrics, Real Analysis, Advanced Micro and Statistics

### RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Intern at CWI (Centrum voor Wiskunde en Informatica – Center for Mathematics and Computer Science, at the Netherlands) for the Microsoft research program "Beyond Search: Semantic Computing and Internet Economics", Summer 2008  
Research Assistant to Professor Marco Ottaviani (Prediction Markets), 2008-2009  
Research Assistant to Professor Peter Eso (Mechanism Design), 2006-2007  
Research Assistant to Professor Michael Whinston (Industrial Organization), 2007

### WORK EXPERIENCE

Consultant, AB InBev, 2005 (economic reports for antitrust issues)  
Consultant, Opus Asset Management, 2004 (design of macroeconomic models)

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### **JOB MARKET PAPER**

“Mechanism Design in Two-Sided Markets: Auctioning Users”

Abstract: Many two-sided platforms (like search engines and business directories) make profits from auctioning their user base to advertisers. Yet, auctioning users is different from selling standard commodities, since the participation decision from users (and therefore the size of the platform's user base) depends on the expected benefit generated by the winning bidder. In this setting, what is the profit-maximizing mechanism? First, I show that, if the bidders' willingness to pay for the match is positively affiliated with their value to users, the revenue-maximizing mechanism is biased towards bidders with low user values. This distortion foregoes attracting users in order to encourage bidders to pay more for a match. Further, I demonstrate that if bidders appropriate a higher fraction of the total value from the match, then the platform should follow a loss leader strategy: it subsidizes users (in cash or by offering free services) to boost supply and further extract rents from bidders. In turn, when charging or subsidizing users is not feasible, the platform distorts its mechanism to select bidders with high (low) user values as a substitute for the subsidies (charges) it would otherwise implement. In this setting, I show that competition between two-sided platforms leads to higher user surplus, but might decrease total welfare when the supply of users is sufficiently inelastic. This result suggests caution for applying standard antitrust economics to two-sided markets.

### **OTHER PAPERS AND WORK IN PROGRESS**

“Bayes-Nash Equilibria of the Generalized Second-Price Auction” (with Kane Sweeney)

“Nonlinear Pricing in Two-Sided Markets”

“Campaign contributions of interest groups: Catering to one candidate or to all?” (with Walter Novaes)

“Dynamic Delegation”

“Externalities in Keyword Auctions: an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment” (with Nicole Immorlica and Evangelos Markakis)

### **REFEREED CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS**

“Bayes-Nash Equilibria of the Generalized Second-Price Auction – Extended Abstract” (with Kane Sweeney), *Proceedings to the 10<sup>th</sup> ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC09)*.

“Externalities in Keyword Auctions: an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment” (with Nicole Immorlica and Evangelos Markakis), *5<sup>th</sup> Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE09)*.

### **PRESENTATIONS**

2008-09: 10<sup>th</sup> ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC09), 5<sup>th</sup> Workshop on Ad Auctions, Yahoo! Research, London Business School, CWI (Amsterdam), University of Maastricht.

### **REFeree EXPERIENCE**

B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

### **OTHER ACADEMIC ACTIVITIES**

Exchange Student at the University of Minnesota, 2001.

President of the Economics Student Union, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, 2000.

### **COMPUTER SKILLS**

Matlab, Stata, SAS

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### **LANGUAGES**

Portuguese (native), English (fluent), French (reading and listening), Spanish (basic)

### **PERSONAL INFORMATION**

Date of Birth: 12/19/1980

Citizenship: Brazilian, Portuguese

Marital status: Single

### **REFERENCES**

Professor Alessandro Pavan (co-chair)

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Evanston, IL 60208

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