

KEZIAH COOK

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RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS

Research: Health, Labor, and Applied Microeconomics
Teaching: Health, Labor, Microeconomics

DOCTORAL STUDIES

Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois
Dissertation: Three Essays on Cost, Value, and Consequences of Health Insurance
Committee Chairperson: Professor David Dranove
Date of Completion: July 2010 (expected)

PREDOCTORAL STUDIES

A.B.: Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2004.
Magna Cum Laude

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

NSF Graduate Research Fellowship, 2004-2007
Susan Bies Dissertation Award, 2008
Distinguished Teaching Assistant, 2008-2009

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Northwestern University, Summer 2009
Economics of Medical Care
Teaching Assistant, Northwestern University, 2008-2009
Economics of Medical Care, Introduction to Microeconomics
Teaching Assistant, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Fall 2008
Health Care Economics
Course Assistant, Harvard University, Department of Mathematics, 2002-2004
Optimization Theory, Linear Algebra, Calculus, Multivariate Calculus

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Summer Associate, Congressional Budget Office, Summer 2007
Research Assistant to Professor David Dranove, Fall 2007 - Winter 2009
Research Assistant to Leemore Dafny, Winter 2008
Research Assistant to Professor Alessandro Pavan, Summer 2006

JOB MARKET PAPER

“What’s it worth to you?: Employer Sponsored Health Insurance and Forgone Wages”

Abstract: Despite a common belief among policy makers that the high cost of employer sponsored health insurance in the U.S. reduces the competitiveness of American firms, standard models of wage setting predict that costly benefits result in lower cash wages. This paper examines wage offsets in the context of frictional labor markets with wages determined through surplus sharing. New Medicare eligibility of a worker’s spouse results in decreased employee

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value from employer sponsored insurance and reduced match surplus. This means workers with newly Medicare eligible spouses should receive a raise in cash wages that offsets a fraction of the reduced value of employer sponsored insurance. Controlling for employee age, and individual characteristics in a sample of near elderly, full-time workers, I find that spousal Medicare eligibility leads to a significant raise of 6 percent if the spouse's only source of private insurance is through the worker's employer.

OTHER PAPERS

“Does Major Illness Cause Financial Catastrophe?” with David Dranove and Andrew Sfekas, forthcoming in *Health Services Research*..

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Citizenship: U.S.A

REFERENCES

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